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Abstract 
 
 
Due to the recent downturn in international equity markets, the interest in real-estate in-
vestments has soared. However, the well-known problems of direct real-estate investments 
complicate becoming well-diversified with this investment class. Indirect real-estate invest-
ments can provide a solution to this problem. Shares of real-estate investment companies are 
very popular in this context. The German market for securitised real-estate investments addi-
tionally provides open-ended real-estate funds (so called “Offene Immobilienfonds”). An 
open-end real-estate fund is a pool of money from many investors, with which a special in-
vestment company, acting as a trustee, invests it in real estate. Thus, the individual investors 
are directly involved in the real-estate market.  
This study is based on monthly and yearly return data from January 1975 to December 
2002. It seeks to identify the short and long-term financial characteristics of investments into 
open-ended real-estate funds, and to compare them with those of other major asset classes like 
bonds, equities, and money market investments. In this sense, the considerations comprise 
extensive univariate and multivariate analyses of real-estate fund returns. Furthermore, the 
long-term risk/return profile of real-estate fund investments relative to other investment op-
portunities is investigated. Additionally, this paper provides a brief overview of the institu-
tional design and role of German open-end real-estate mutual funds. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the financial characteristics of open-ended real-estate 
funds clearly distinguish them from other (financial) asset classes. These characteristics are in 
many respects similar to those known from direct real-estate investments. Accordingly, the 
German open-end real-estate funds qualify themselves more for medium and long-term in-
vestment horizons, than for short holding periods. All in all, this indirect real-estate invest-
ment vehicle is characterised by moderate and relatively stable returns over time. 
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1  Introduction 
The empirical real-estate literature shows that the return characteristics of property port-
folios are significantly different from those of financial assets, like bonds and stocks.
1 Typi-
cally, property portfolios have a lower mean return than that of stocks and bonds, but also 
show a lower volatility and low co-movements with financial asset classes. Furthermore, real-
estate returns exhibit significant positive serial correlation, indicating a mean-reverting behav-
iour over time. Due to these specific risk and return characteristics, property was shown to be 
beneficial in diversifying multi-asset portfolios. Typically, in portfolio allocation strategies, 
property primarily plays the role of a “risk stabiliser”, while stocks contribute as a “return 
driver”. In addition to its diversification benefits, there is a general belief that investment in 
real estate is an effective vehicle to insulate the risk of inflationary erosion, which is particu-
larly important for long-term pension investments. However, some adverse features associ-
ated with direct ownership may offset the benefits by adding direct property investments into 
asset allocation strategies.  Ball, Lizieri, and MacGregor (1998), Hoesli and MacGregor 
(2000), Seiler, Webb, and Myer (2001), among others, pointed out that these problematic fea-
tures include the following: the large lot size of property investments, the lack of a central 
market where continuous information on property transaction is provided, high transaction 
costs, low liquidity, the need for local market knowledge and management requirements of 
direct property investments. 
A potential alternative to avoid the drawbacks of direct property ownership is to pur-
chase units of property companies. The basic idea of such equity-type indirect property vehi-
cles is to pool money by selling shares to many investors and invest it into a portfolio of in-
come-producing properties, such as housing, commercial properties, or both. Investors gain a 
number of advantages by buying shares of a property company. First, a property investment 
company may provide investors with economics of scale on transaction and management 
costs by pooling the assets of many individuals. As unit costs are low compared to direct 
property ownership, investors are highly flexible to invest part of their wealth into and/or 
withdraw from real-estate companies, e.g. to accumulate money for future pensions, or to fi-
nance consumption during the post-retirement phase. Second, investors are able to enjoy a 
degree of within-property portfolio diversification, which they could not achieve on their 
own, due to their low investment budget. Third, property investment companies provide ac-
cess to and benefit from the expertise of skilled and specialised asset managers, which select 
and manage the fund’s properties. Forth, units of property companies are more liquid than 
direct holdings, insofar as unit holders can ask for redemption of their holdings to net asset 
value prices at any point in time (in the case of an open-ended fund), or they can sell them in 
an active secondary market (in the case of a closed-end fund). Furthermore, investment funds 
are (if tax credits are provided) regulated by a comprehensive legal framework that is de-
signed to protect investors’ rights. Finally, since unit prices are publicly available, indirect 
real-estate investments heightened the transparency of disclosed information on risk and re-
turn. This enables investors to make financial decisions based on comparable information, as 
with stocks and bonds. 
There are also disadvantages that come along with ownership of real-estate investment 
funds. First, as with any other financial intermediary, there are costs associated with investing 
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through investment funds. The fund management charges an investment management fee, and 
investors must pay to cover the administration cost, e.g. for providing investors with financial 
statements, and for employing custodial and accounting services. To cover the distribution 
and sales costs, the investor pays either a front-end load when purchasing, or a back-end load 
when selling a fund unit. Further transaction costs arise in connection with the purchase and 
the sale of properties to implement (start-up costs) and to update (turnover costs) the fund’s 
portfolio strategy. Other disadvantages with indirect property investment can be caused by 
taxation, especially for tax-exempt investors l ike pension funds, if real-estate investment 
funds are not fully tax-transparent. In addition, there could be a lack of management control, 
since it might be difficult for investors to get full information on the property assets and the 
development schemes of the investment fund. Finally, the critical question, whether the re-
turns of these financial claims “backed” by real estate-related assets behave like direct prop-
erty investments or whether they are another type of stock, has been the centrepiece of nu-
merous empirical studies. 
Most of the empirical work addressing this question has focused on the risk and return 
characteristics of closed-end real-estate funds, whose units are traded on an active secondary 
market. Such an indirect investment vehicle issues a fixed number of shares, usually leverage 
the position of the common shareholders by issuing debt, and must not follow the principle of 
diversification due to financial regulation. If the funds enjoyed favourable tax treatments, tax 
authorities would require special conditions, i.e. number of shareholders, composition of the 
real-estate portfolios, or income-distribution to shareholders among others. Investors who are 
simultaneously shareholders of the investment company do not have the right to redeem their 
units to the fund company. Instead, shareholders must sell them on a secondary market. The 
price of a closed-end share is thus determined by supply and demand and can fall below, or 
rise above, the net asset value per share. Particularly for listed Real-Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) in the USA, the empirical literature shows that the returns on such shares are highly 
volatile and exhibit high degrees of correlation with the stock market. In addition, listed prop-
erty companies are often priced with substantial net asset value discounts. Similar results are 
reported for traded property companies in the UK, France, and Canada.
2 
Open-end funds, also referred to as mutual funds, do not have a fixed number of out-
standing units. Instead, the number of shares changes as the funds continually stand ready to 
both sell new shares to all kinds of investors, and to redeem old shares on demand from them. 
While an open-end structure for real-estate funds is an interesting institutional design, the 
empirical literature is considerably rare. For example, Hoesli and Anderson (1991) and Hoesli 
(1993) report that Swiss real-estate mutual funds exhibit a lower risk and return than shares, 
and a higher risk and return than bonds. However, these results are not generally transferable, 
as the real-estate funds in Switzerland are not obliged to redeem shares at any time. An inves-
tor has to announce the redemption of his units twelve months before the end of the fiscal 
year. To compensate for the disadvantage of the long notification period, the shares are usu-
ally quoted at the stock market. Due to the limited redemption possibilities, Hoesli (1993) 
characterised the Swiss real-estate funds as “semi-closed-end”. 
In this study, we focus on German open-end real-estate funds, which are important indi-
rect property investment vehicles in the German capital market. From the investor’s perspec-
tive, they are similar to REITs paper assets that are backed by direct properties, tax exempt on 
the corporate level, and have the possibility to accumulate and/or disperse assets in small lot 
sizes. However, German real-estate mutual funds exhibit a pure open-end architecture, as the 
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funds do not have a fixed number of units. While fund units are not traded on a secondary 
market (e.g. the stock exchange), they are liquid like traded stocks because investors can ask 
for redemption of their fund units on a daily basis. The unit price is based on the fund’s net 
asset value, which is determined by regular valuations of the properties held by the fund. As a 
result of this “pricing” based on valuation rather than on a secondary market place, the per-
formance of real-estate mutual funds might be closer to the underlying direct market than 
listed property company shares, which are exposed to the day-to-day pricing volatility of the 
stock markets. However, the advantages of an open-end structure for real-estate funds are not 
without burden. Besides estimating the market value of the fund’s properties, which are not 
directly substantiated by sales, a central point is the appropriate management of long-term 
illiquid property investments with short-term daily callable liabilities. The solution to these 
problems might influence the risk and return profiles that investors receive by investing in an 
open-end real-estate fund. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the institutional 
design, the regulatory environment, as well as size and role of open-end real-estate funds in 
the German market. In addition, we examine the ways that German real-estate mutual funds 
address the structural liquidity mismatch of assets and liabilities. In section 3, we address the 
short-term risk and return characteristics of real-estate funds employing time series analysis, 
and compare them with other major asset classes, like money market instruments, bonds, and 
stocks. In section 4, we analyse the risk and return characteristics of real-estate funds for 
long-term horizons, which are typical for pension investments. In addition, we examine the 
question of whether the risk-return characteristics of real-estate mutual funds over different 
investment horizons can be replicated by using a simple portfolio strategy consisting of cash 
and bonds. Section 5 offers a summary and the main conclusions. 
2  Real-Estate Mutual Funds in Germany 
2.1  Size and Role in the Mutual Fund Market  
German real-estate mutual funds („Offene Immobilienfonds“) are fiscally transparent 
open-end investment funds and may invest in properties, certain types of participations in 
real-estate companies, and in fixed income instruments (e.g. bonds and money markets vehi-
cles). They have operated for over four decades in the German mutual fund market.
3 Table 1 
provides an overview of the number and the total amount of assets under management of the 
real-estate mutual funds, compared with security-based funds. Compared with security-based 
funds, the number of real-estate mutual funds is low. By the end of 2002, investors could 
choose between 22 different real-estate mutual funds, which were managed by 14 investment 
management companies registered in Germany. Most of them are owned by commercial 
banks using their network of branches throughout Germany as the most important distribution 
channel for mutual funds products. 
In contrast to the number of funds offered, the real-estate mutual funds are important 
players in the German mutual fund market with respect to assets under management. In 2002, 
more than 70 bill. € were invested in real-estate mutual funds, representing a market share of 
nearly 19% of total assets under management in the German mutual fund industry. The aver-
age volume of assets under management is 3 bill. €, while security-based funds averaged only 
0.15 bill. €. In addition, high cash inflows in this investment vehicle could be observed over 
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the last decade, except in 2000. After the stock market collapse in 2002, real-estate funds 
faced tremendous cash inflows of about 15 bill. €.  
Table 1: German Real-Estate Mutual Funds: 
Assets under Management and Net Cash Flow 
Year  Number 
(all mutual funds) 
Assets in mill. € 
(in % of total assets) 
Net Cash Flow 
(in mill. €) 
1993  14  (667)  21,840  (13.64 %)  7,466 
1994  14  (793)  25,764  (13.73%)  3,914 
1995  14  (919)  29,694  (14.82%)  3,489 
1996  14  (1,058)  37,023  (16.89%)  7,113 
1997  15  (1,188)  40,493  (16.09%)  3,274 
1998  16  (1,343)  43,137  (14.96%)  2,392 
1999  17  (1,477)  50,403  (12.86%)  7,483 
2000  19  (1,717)  47,919  (11.31%)  -2,821 
2001  19  (1,939  55,868  (13.38%)  7,312 
2002  22  (2,068)  71,165  (18.63%)  14,903 
Source: 2002 Yearbook of German Investment- and Asset Management Association (BVI) 
Looking at the percentage change of the funds’ volume and the prior year, the stock 
market return (measured by the major German stock index, the DAX) shows a coefficient of 
correlation of –0.52. It seems that German fund investors consider real-estate mutual funds at 
to be, in part, a ‘flight to quality’ investment. This means that after low prior stock market 
returns, investors become more risk-averse. They shift to less risky assets and demand higher 
expected real returns on risky assets. However, it should be noted that with respect to this 
safe-haven feature, real-estate funds are competing especially with money market instru-
ments, which offer also stable and positive returns over short investment horizons. Therefore, 
it is also necessary to study the role of real-estate funds with respect to the long investment 
horizons, which are typical for pension investments.   
2.2  Legal Environment and Regulation 
Regarding their legal framework, real-estate mutual funds may be managed by an in-
vestment management fund company (“Kapitalanlagegesellschaft”, subsequently referred to 
as KAG) which is a specialised bank in the field of asset management. A German KAG may 
be operated only in the legal form of a joint stock cooperation, or a limited liability company, 
and usually manages the assets of many different mutual funds. Its shareholders are not the 
investors in the funds, but typically banks or insurance companies. From a legal point of view, 
the mutual fund itself (“Sondervermögen”) is a special asset pool funded by the investors’ 
capital contributions and must be strictly separated from the investment company’s own as-
sets. The unit certificates held by the investors are not comparable to equities, but are special 
securities representing a contractual claim of the unit-holder against the investment fund. The 
fund is managed on the basis of a management contract by the investment management com-
pany and the unit holders. 
Investment management companies that offer real-estate mutual funds are regulated by 
a comprehensive legal framework, primarily by the Investment Company Act (“Gesetz über 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften”, subsequently KAGG). The KAGG is a special law designed to 
provide investor protection, and is the statutory basis for the German investment fund market. -5- 
 
It regulates a number of legal aspects, such as licensing requirements, the organisational 
structure, the function and purpose of custodians, permitted investments, investment restric-
tions, valuation, accounting, auditing and publication requirements. The state supervision of 
the rules codified in the Investment Company Act is exercised by the federal financial super-
visory authority (“BaFin”), a legal compliance supervision. The supervisory authority is not 
permitted to intervene with the business decision of an investment management company, as 
long as these are in conformity with the existing laws and regulations.
4 Special requirements 
of the Investment Companies Act belonging to real-estate mutual funds include the intra risk 
diversification of properties (i.e. no single property’s value may exceed 15% of the fund’s 
capital), a minimum investment weight into properties (i.e. at least 51% of the fund’s capital 
must be invested in properties), a minimum liquidity reserve (i.e. 5% of the fund’s assets), 
restriction on financial leverage (not more than 50% of the fund’s property portfolio) and 
rules regarding the appraisal of the fund’s properties by independent experts. 
Since the implementation of real-estate mutual funds in the Investment Company Act in 
1969, the law was subject to a number of important amendments, which extended the invest-
ment opportunities for real-estate mutual funds. The novel in 1990 allowed the funds to ac-
quire properties in all EU-countries. Since 1998, real-estate funds have the possibility to in-
vest in shares of property companies. The latest amendment was the 4
th financial market im-
provement act (“Finanzmarkt Förderungsgesetz”) in 2002, which facilitated the possibilities 
for real-estate funds to invest internationally outside the European Union. Before the act, it 
was only possible to invest 20% of the fund’s capital outside the Euro zone. After the act, the 
funds are allowed to invest 100% of their capital internationally, as long as their un-hedged 
currency exposure does not exceed 30% of the fund’s capital. Traditionally, the majority of 
the fund’s properties are located in German cities. However, ever since the relaxation of in-
vestment regulations, the funds have been investing more in foreign countries, especially with 
the European Union where about one-third of the properties are located. 
In addition to the Investment Company Act, investment funds are also subject to a num-
ber of other laws. For example, the promotion and public marketing of German real-estate 
mutual funds in foreign countries require notification of the national supervisory authorities. 
With respect to the notification process, one must distinguish between foreign funds situated 
in EU member states, or in states party to the European Economic Area, which set up the Di-
rective 85/611/EEC (UCITS-funds) and other foreign funds (non UCITS-funds). While 
UCITS funds are subject to a simplified notification procedure, all other foreign funds pub-
licly marketed in a member state must comply to more rigorous requirements for permission 
to sell outside the home country. UCITS funds must invest in bonds and/or equities that are 
quoted on the stock exchange. Hence, German real-estate mutual funds are currently inconsis-
tent with the UCITS Directive.  
2.3  Problems Resulting from the Open-End Architecture of Real-Estate Funds 
In contrast to US-type Real-Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), the Swiss real-estate mu-
tual funds and the property companies in U.K. or in France, there is a limited secondary mar-
ket for units of German real-estate funds, since they are not quoted on a stock exchange. 
However, the fund units are liquid because investors can ask for redemption daily. To main-
tain the open-end principle, the funds continuously offer new shares to the public. The re-
demption price is based on the net asset value per unit. The issue prices are calculated like-
wise on the basis of the net asset value, plus an offering charge, which is usually 5%. The net 
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asset value is found by the actual market value of all assets held by the mutual fund, less any 
fund liability, divided by the number of issued units. Aside from properties, the assets of the 
funds consist of fixed income instruments (bonds, T -bills, and cash). While financial assets 
are valued according to their current market prices, the market value of the funds’ property 
portfolio relies on estimations by independent experts. In general, the funds’ properties are 
evaluated once a year at different points in time throughout the calendar year. There are two 
problems connected with estimating the value of properties which are not directly substanti-
ated by sales. First, the valuation must reflect the current market value of the property asset so 
that unit holders redeeming do so at a price that does not penalize those unit holders who wish 
to remain invested long-term. Since real-estate funds are due to state supervision, the gov-
ernment regulates the valuation techniques. According to the “Wertermittlungsverordnung” 
property appraisals are (usually) gained by using the income approach. This means, the ap-
praiser determines the stream of net-rents that are expected from the property and use a capi-
talisation rate to discount these cash flows. 
A second problem associated with property appraisals is smoothing. Smoothing means 
that appraisal-based return series understate the true variability of returns in the property mar-
ket.
5 In contrast to stocks and bonds, which are frequently traded in an auction market that 
adjusts rapidly to changes in information and expectations, real-estate is infrequently traded in 
a negotiated market. Most real-estate practitioners and academics believe that – as a result of 
appraisal anchoring to previous estimates and aggregation of information over time – property 
appraisals tend to lag movements in the property market and understate the true volatility of 
the underlying property values. Therefore, Ross and Zisler (1991) and Geltner (1989, 1991), 
among others, suggest comparing risk return statistics of appraisal-based returns to that of 
financial assets (e.g. stocks and bonds), only after correcting for appraisal smoothing. How-
ever, in contrast to direct property ownership, the smoothed prices of the German real-estate 
funds represent the amount at which the fund must redeem units at each point in time. There-
fore, as Hoesli and Hamelink 1996 mentioned, despite the fact that the risk level of real-estate 
mutual fund units are probably artificially low, the smoothed return for unit holders is the 
actual holding period return which they receive. 
The open-end structure of real-estate mutual funds causes an additional problem which 
is also typical for credit banks: the danger of a bank run resulting from long-term illiquid 
property investments in conjunction with short-term daily callable liabilities. Little (1992) 
reported for the Australian market, that a general decline in the property industry created a 
real crisis in investor confidence, which overflowed into a run on the redemption of unlisted 
open-end property trusts. Because of extensive redemption of unit holders rapidly consuming 
the funds’ liquid asset, forced sales of property became necessary to produce the additional 
liquidity. At the end, the Australian government intervened and extended the redemption pe-
riod for all unlisted property investments to 12 months.
6 
What are the features to address the structural liquidity discord concerning the assets 
and liabilities of an open-end real-estate fund? Besides the possibility to stop the re-purchase 
of shares for a maximum of two years, an important feature is to hold an appropriate cash 
                                                 
5 See Hoesli and MacGregor (2000), p. 59. 
6 A similar run happened at the beginning of the last decade in the case of the Dutch Rodamco crisis (see 
Helmer 1997, p. 126). In the German market for open-end real-estate funds the A.G.I. Nr. 1 was closed in 1993, 
because unit-holders (mostly institutional investors) asked their money back. However, in contrast to the Austra-
lian and Dutch case this was not a crisis of the hole industry for open-end real-estate funds, but merely a problem 
of a single fund. At the end, the A.G.I. Nr.1 was merged with another open-end real-estate fund (see Sebastian 
2003, p. 67). -7- 
 
reserve. The cash reserve can be used to meet the redemption guarantee in the case of unex-
pected cash outflows. It can also be used to invest money for the short term in case of unex-
pected cash inflows. As  Exhibit 1 shows, German real-estate mutual funds typically hold 
about 25-49% of their assets in cash and fixed-income securities. Therefore, the risk and re-
turn characteristics of the fund units do not represent a pure property portfolio, but rather a 
multi-asset portfolio consisting of fixed-income instruments and properties. From the inves-
tor’s perspective, this raises the question about the impact of this dilution effect with respect 
to the financial characteristics of real-estate fund returns. 
Another instrument to avoid frequent trading with the fund units is the bid-ask spread 
between the sale and the redemption price. From an economic point of view, the offering 
premium of about 5% is not only raised to cover sales costs, but also to build an effective bar-
rier which make short-term investment horizons, and therefore, frequent transaction with the 
fund units, unattractive.
7 From the investor’s perspective, this raises the question about the 
required minimum investment horizon that is necessary to overcome the negative return effect 
of the bid-ask spread. 
Exhibit 1: Portfolio Composition of German Real-Estate Mutual Funds 
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3  Analysis of Short-Term Returns 
3.1  Data Collection and Description 
In this section, the short-term return characteristics of open-end real-estate funds are 
analysed and compared with major asset classes, i.e. stocks, bonds, and cash. The data sample 
consists of the month-end unit prices Pi,t adjusted for dividends, splits, and net of management 
fees of all real-estate funds that are publicly offered in the German market over the time pe-
riod from January 1975 until December 2002. For each fund i, the monthly nominal (pre-tax) 
returns Ri,t = Pi,t / Pi,t-1 –1 are calculated. For each of the t = 1, ..., 336 months of the sample 
period, the monthly return of a real-estate fund index portfolio is determined according to: 
  R    x   =   R t   i, t   i,
n
=1 i
t   P,
t
￿   (1) 
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Here, nt stands for the number of companies within the index portfolio in month t, and 
xi,t for the portfolio weight of company i in month t with Sxi,t = 1. Finally, the discrete index 
returns were converted to log-returns. At the beginning of the sample period in 1975, nt = 8, 
and at the end in 2002, nt = 22. One fund was closed in 1993 (i.e. the A.G.I.V Nr. 1), hence 
the index is free from survivorship bias. In order to take market coverage into account, the 
assets under management were used as portfolio weights at the beginning of each year. The 
index could be a representative of a well-diversified index fund that invests in the different 
real-estate mutual funds under consideration. 
To represent the stock and bond markets, the index returns of two major indices, i.e. the 
DAX and the REXP, are used. The former is an index portfolio of German blue chips, while 
the latter represents a portfolio of German government bonds. Each of these indices are value-
weighted, based on market capitalisation and adjusted for capital gains, as well as dividends 
and coupon payments (on a pre-tax basis). As a proxy for a money market fund, we used the 
one-month interest rates provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (European Central Bank re-
spectively). To reflect potential administration costs for managing an index portfolio, the 
equivalent of 0.5% p.a. was subtracted from the returns of the bond, stock, and cash invest-
ments. 
The continuously compounded rate of inflation pt from t-1 to t is formally defined by pt 
= ln(CPIt) – ln(CPIt-1). CPIt stands for the country's price level at time t, measured by an ap-
propriate consumer price index (CPI). The real log-return for each index portfolio under con-
sideration, rP,t, is defined as the continuously compounded nominal return R’P,t = ln(1 + RP,t), 
minus the observed inflation rate, formally  rP,t = R’P,t - pt. 
Statistical properties of the monthly and yearly, as well as nominal and real log-returns 
for each of the four asset categories are reported in Table 2. 
Regarding the mean returns and the standard deviations of the monthly and yearly 
nominal log-returns in panels A1 and A2, it can be observed that they are quite different 
among the four asset classes. Real-estate funds, on average, return 0.50% per month with a 
volatility of 0.20%, which indicates quite stable returns over time. With 0.76%, the monthly 
return on equities is about 50% higher than the return on real-estate funds. The monthly vola-
tility of equities’ returns, however, is about 30 times the volatility of real-estate fund returns. 
Bonds return 16% more and exhibit about 5.5 times more volatility than real-estate funds. The 
volatility of money market returns with 0.19% p.m. is only slightly lower compared to real-
estate funds; however, the mean return is about 15% below that of real-estate funds. Due to 
front-end loads, the monthly average returns are not the expected returns for a potential inves-
tor willing to buy units of the various asset categories over a short investment horizon. 
Assuming independent and identically distributed (iid) returns, the mapping from 
monthly to yearly log-returns is straightforward. Means are scaled up by factor twelve and the 
volatility of the yearly returns on risky assets is just:  
Volatility p.a. = ￿12 * Volatility p.m. 
Deviations from this ratio may indicate serial correlation in the monthly return time se-
ries. While the empirical scaling factors between the average returns by construction remain 
equal among the various asset categories (i.e. scaled up by nearly the same factor twelve), 
those for the volatilities significantly differ (see Table 2, Panel C). Compared to equities and 
bonds, whose yearly volatilities are about 4.5 times the monthly, the volatility of real-estate 
fund returns increases (statistically distinguishable from ￿12 at the 1%-confidence level) by 
factor 7.75. However, real-estate funds still have the lowest volatility for nominal yearly log--9- 
 
returns, since the money market volatility increases by factor 11.8 when moving from 
monthly to yearly returns.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Monthly and Yearly Returns (01/1975 - 12/2002) 
    Real-Estate 
Funds    Cash    Bonds    Stocks 
Panel A1: Monthly Nominal Returns 
Mean    0.50    0.42    0.58    0.76 
STD    0.20    0.19    1.11    6.00 
Panel A2 Yearly Nominal Returns 
Mean    6.06    4.99    6.91    9.05 
Volatility    1.55    2.24    5.12    26.19 
Panel B1: Monthly Real Returns 
Mean    0.28    0.19    0.35    0.53 
STD    0.34    0.29    1.18    6.00 
Panel B2: Yearly Real Returns 
Mean    3.40    2.33    4.26    6.39 
STD    1.64    1.60    5.39    26.11 
Panel C: Standard Deviation Ratio (SDE) 
Nominal Returns    7.75    11.79    4.61    4.37 
Real Returns    4.82    5.52    4.57    4.35 
Notes: Mean and volatility (STD) values in % per month. SDE is the ratio between the yearly and monthly return standard devia-
tions. Bold values significantly deviate from 12
0.5 at 1%-level, non-bold do not deviate from 12
0.5 at any conventional level of signifi-
cance.  
In contrast to nominal returns, the observed volatility scaling factors for real returns are 
quite homogenous among the different asset categories, and much closer to the theoretical 
value under the iid assumption (i.e. about 3.46). For bonds (4.57) and stocks (4.35) the scaling 
factors are nearly the same as for nominal returns. On the other hand, for real-estate funds 
(4.97) and cash (5.52), the scaling factor is significantly lower as in the case of nominal re-
turns. As Fama and Schwert (1977) pointed out, such heterogeneous serial correlation of 
nominal returns combined with relatively homogeneous serial correlations in real returns for 
different asset categories is due to the fact that “inflation-related variation in nominal returns 
is common to all assets”. 
3.2  Stability of Mean Returns and Volatility 
In the context of asset allocation decisions, stability of average returns and volatilities is 
essential, since they are among the most important input parameters in determining optimal 
portfolios. To gain a first impression, the stability of the means and the volatilities is assessed 
by re-calculating the monthly averages and volatilities, using rolling sampling windows of 
different lengths. Table 3 and Table 4 summarize the results for window lengths of 24, 60, 
and 120 months.
8 As can be seen, depending on the period length, the average monthly re-
                                                 
8 The entire period, 01/1975 – 12/2002 (i.e. 336 months), was divided into 313, 277, and 217 overlapping 
sub-periods of 24, 60, and 120 months, each shifted by one month (e.g. 01/1975–12/1976, 02/1975–01/1977, 
…). For each of these periods, the mean return and volatility were calculated. -10- 
 
turns change over time. Like the return on money market investments, the average real-estate 
fund returns vary only slightly, while the average return on bonds, and especially on equities, 
deviates significantly, depending on the period length. The results for the volatilities are even 
more extreme. The volatilities of real-estate fund and money market returns are virtually con-
stant, whereas equity returns display considerable heteroscedasticity.  
Table 3: Stability of Rolling Means for Monthly Nominal Returns (01/1975 - 12/2002) 
      24 months    60 months    120 months 
Mean    0.50    0.51    0.53  Real-Estate 
Funds  STD    0.12    0.09    0.03 
Mean    0.47    0.48    0.50 
Cash  STD    0.17    0.13    0.04 
Mean    0.60    0.60    0.62 
Bonds  STD    0.30    0.15    0.03 
Mean    0.93    1.05    1.06 
Stocks  STD    1.26    0.65    0.23 
Notes: Values in % p.m. Mean (Std.Dev) represents the average over (the standard deviation of) the rolling mean returns 
for the respective asset class and window length. 
Table 4: Stability of Rolling Volatilities for Monthly Returns (01/1975 - 12/2002) 
      24 months    60 months    120 months 
Mean    0.15    0.17    0.19  Real-Estate 
Funds  STD    0.03    0.03    0.02 
Mean    0.07    0.14    0.18 
Cash  STD    0.05    0.06    0.02 
Mean    1.05    1.12    1.11 
Bonds  STD    0.33    0.24    0.15 
Mean    5.30    5.43    5.70 
Stocks  STD    1.86    1.47    0.77 
Notes: Values in % p.m. Mean (STD) represents the average over (the standard deviation of) the rolling volatilities for 
the respective asset class and window length. 
The longer the rolling window, the more stable are the average returns and volatilities. 
This results from an increasing overlap, since the window is only shifted in monthly steps. 
Using a once-monthly shifted window increases the sample size, but only at the expense of 
high interdependencies between adjacent sub-periods. 
The problem of interdependencies can be overcome by dividing the whole period into 
non-overlapping sub-periods, to provide a formal test of stability. Table 5 shows the monthly 
average returns and volatilities of real-estate fund investments in non-overlapping sub-periods 
of 7-years length. When dividing the sample period into sub-periods, a trade-off must be 
made between short sub-periods, which may adequately describe the inter-period relation-
ships at the expense of an only small intra-period sample size, and longer sub-periods, which 
may be based on a sufficient number of intra-period observations, which, however, may also 
average out inter-period relationships. We found a sub-period length of 7 years to be a good 
compromise. -11- 
 
Parameter stability was scrutinized by pair-wisely testing each two sub-periods for the 
same mean return and volatility. Since the standard t- and F-tests heavily depend on the as-
sumption of normality, non-parametric tests (Levene and Brown-Forsyth for testing the vola-
tilities, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis for testing the medians that substitute the arithmetic 
means in the context of non-parametric tests) were used to test the stability of the parameters. 
However, in most cases, the standard parametric tests would have delivered the same results 
as the non-parametric tests. 
Table 5: Stability of Monthly Average Returns and Volatilities over 
Non-Overlapping Sub-Periods (1/1975 – 12/2002) 
    Sub-Period    Real-Estate  
Funds 
  Cash     Bonds    Stocks 
Mean    1975-1981    0.50    0.47    0.53    0.59 
    1982-1988    0.53    0.40    0.72    1.43 
    1989-1995    0.61    0.54    0.59    0.69 
    1996-2002    0.38    0.25    0.47    0.30 
Volatility    1975-1981    0.17    0.24    1.39    3.69 
    1982-1988    0.17    0.13    1.06    6.29 
    1989-1995    0.21    0.14    1.06    5.37 
    1996-2002    0.15    0.05    0.89    7.90 
Notes: Values in % p.m.  
Apart from one pair of sub-periods, the differences in mean returns on real-estate funds 
are highly significant for all other pairs of sub-periods. The same results are found for the 
money market. Although mean returns on bonds, and especially on stocks, strongly fluctuate 
over time, the tests failed to reject the null of constant mean returns on stocks and bonds for 
any pair of sub-periods. This statistical insignificance may be due to the high level of volatil-
ity compared to the level of mean returns. In the context of portfolio choice, however, these 
fluctuations are of high economic importance.  
Looking at volatilities, the real-estate funds were found to exhibit significant differences 
for only one pair of sub-periods, while for the other pairs the null of constant volatilities could 
not be rejected at any common level of significance. Contrarily, constant volatilities were re-
jected for five pairs of sub-periods in the case of the money market, and for four pairs in the 
case of stocks. For bonds, the varying volatility was rejected for only one pair of sub-periods.  
These results emphasize the importance of selecting the period for which the estimated 
parameters are considered representative for future returns, which is perennially required in 
the asset allocation process.
9 
3.3  A Closer Look to Serial Return Correlation of Real-Estate Funds 
As seen above, the volatility of real-estate fund returns disproportionately increases 
when moving from a monthly to a yearly perspective. This gives reason to further analyses 
                                                 
9 For insights into how to handle estimation risk in the context of portfolio choice, see e.g. Best and 
Grauer (1991), Chopra and Ziemba (1993), and Herold and Maurer (2002). -12- 
 
into the inter-temporal dependencies in real-estate returns. Table 6 displays the autocorrela-
tion structure of monthly/yearly (nominal/real) real-estate fund returns for the lags 1 – 12. As 
can be seen in panel A, monthly nominal real-estate fund returns exhibit significant autocorre-
lation at all lags. The shape of the structure resembles an “autocorrelation smile”. Autocorre-
lation drops from 0.44 at lag 1 to 0.28 at lag 5, to then increase again to 0.42 at lag 12. Similar 
autocorrelation structures can be found when analysing the single real-estate fund return’s 
time series. 
Table 6: Autocorrelation Structure of Real-Estate Fund Returns (1/1975 – 12/2002) 
Lag  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Panel A: Monthly Returns 
Nominal  0.44  0.38  0.42  0.32  0.28  0.40  0.27  0.35  0.41  0.33  0.27  0.42 
Real  0.22  0.07  0.12  0.01  0.01  -0.04  0.02  0.07  0.15  0.02  0.17  0.41 
Panel B: Yearly Returns 
Nominal  0.69  0.38  0.07  -0.26  -0.26  -0.33  -0.27  -0.07  0.06  0.17  0.19  0.03 
Real  0.50  0.39  0.26  0.10  0.06  0.06  -0.16  -0.10  -0.14  -0.18  -0.31  -0.17 
Notes: Values in bold type are significantly different from 0 at the 5%-level.  
Reasons for serially correlated monthly real-estate funds returns may be manifold. The 
real-estate fund returns can be separated into two components. The return on liquid financial 
assets on the one side (i.e. cash and bonds), the return on illiquid property on the other. From 
the liquid side, autocorrelation may be induced by money market investments, which tend to 
be highly auto-correlated on monthly basis. Serial correlation may also result from the illiq-
uidity of property portfolios. Infrequent transactions lead to distorted market values and leave 
valuation to appraisers. As mentioned by Hoesli and MacGregor (2000, p. 59) among others, 
they in turn can only base their appraisals on insufficient information, such as the last reported 
value of the building and possibly recent transactions in comparable properties. 
Autocorrelation may also result from inflation-indexed lease contracts. In general, the 
negotiated rental fee is subject to increase, if a specified price index rises above a certain 
level. Since rents are a major return driver for real-estate funds, this mechanism links inflation 
to their returns. Inflation is commonly known to be auto-correlated. Thus, the vehicle of infla-
tion-indexed lease contracts may induce autocorrelation in real-estate fund returns. To elimi-
nate inflation effects, the autocorrelation structure is again analysed using real return time 
series.  
Adjusting monthly returns for inflation significantly reduces autocorrelation in the re-
turn time series for real-estate investments. Inflation-adjusted returns exhibit some autocorre-
lation at lag 1, but hardly any at higher lags. This may indicate that inflation has indeed an 
influence on the autocorrelation of real-estate fund returns. The practice of inflation adjust-
ment codified in the lease contracts, however, leads to inflation only having delayed influence 
on lease prices and on returns, and therefore, on the autocorrelation at higher lags. The auto-
correlation at lag 12, however, is not affected by the inflation adjustment. This may be evi-
dence for annual events, e.g. appraisals of property, having an impact on the autocorrelation 
structure of returns. 
Regarding yearly returns (Panel B), nominal and real returns on real-estate funds exhibit 
significant serial correlation only at lag 1. With a coefficient of autocorrelation of nearly 0.7 -13- 
 
for nominal and 0.5 for real returns, these heavily depend on the return in the previous period. 
Up to lag 3, nominal returns show a positive autocorrelation. For lags 4 to 8, serial correlation 
is negative, only to then again become positive for lags 9 to 12, a phenomenon that will be 
looked at more closely in the following passage. 
Autocorrelation in real-estate fund returns can also be caused by real-estate cycles.
10 
Contrary to the familiar return characteristics of stock and bond markets, the real-estate fund 
index return series does not stagger regularly around its mean; it exhibits periods of several 
years with monthly returns below the long-term average, followed by years with above-
average returns. The consideration of the cyclical behaviour of real-estate fund returns in stra-
tegic investment decisions is of great importance, especially due to the fact that real estate is a 
long-term investment.  
Without having to specify a model that can economically explain this cyclical behav-
iour, harmonic analysis provides a formal means to study statistical properties of these cycles 
(see Pyhrr, Roulac, and Born (1999) for a review of real-estate cycle models and literature). 
Technically, a cyclical time series can be interpreted as a superposition of several sine and 
cosine curves (see Crawford (2001), p. 29). With simultaneous consideration of a linear trend, 
seasonality, and cyclical behaviour, the model 
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can be fit to the respective real-estate time series via OLS-regression (see Richardson (2002)). 
The ai are regression coefficients and t is the time index, i.e. t = 1, 2, 3, ... for the first, second, 
third, ... observation. SL is the season period parameter, and CL the cycle period (“cycle 
length”) parameter, i.e. the cycle length is CL/12 years for monthly data. To estimate cycle 
length, the regression model is evaluated for different combinations of SL and CL, whereby 
the best fit provides the estimates for SL and CL.  
Using different settings of the model above, with and without the trend component, and 
with and without the seasonal component, the pure sine/cosine representation, without trend 
and without seasonality, proves most adequate for the time series under consideration. The 
MAPE (mean percentage squared error) and the R²-criterion are used to determine the quality 
of fit with the MAPE proving to be the most adequate criterion. The original real-estate fund 
index return time series and the fitted sine/cosine curve are given in Exhibit 2. 
The sine/cosine curve provides a good fit for the original return series. The cycle length 
of this fit is 132 periods, i.e. 11 years. Since the real-estate fund index is an aggregate of many 
funds, this cycle may be artificial and result rather from index calculation than from real-
estate fund economics. To explore the reasons for the cyclical behaviour of real-estate fund 
indexes, the cycle analysis is also applied to single real-estate funds. 
Fitting sine/cosine curves to the return series of the single funds leads to similar results. 
Apart from the Grundwert-Fonds, which shows a cycle length of nearly 13 years, the single 
funds also have cycle lengths of about 11 years. This shows that cyclical behaviour is not an 
artificial characteristic of the real-estate fund index, but rather an inherent feature of real-
estate fund returns, a property also exhibited by direct real-estate investments (see e.g. 
                                                 
10 “Property cycles are recurrent, but irregular fluctuations regarding the rate of all-property total returns, 
which are also apparent in many other indicators of property activity, but with varying leads and lags against the 
all-property cycle.” (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors Report 1994, p. 127.) -14- 
 
Maurer, Reiner, and Sebastian (2003), Ball, Lizieri, and MacGregor (1998)). The results are 
summarized in Table 7. 
Exhibit 2: Real-Estate Market Cycles (01/1975 - 12/2002) 
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Notes: The intersected line represents the original return series, the solid line is the sine/cosine curve, which was fitted 
using the MAPE criterion. 
The obviously high, persistent autocorrelation in and cyclicity of the real-estate fund re-
turn time series shows that these returns are only partially stochastic. Knowing that at time t 
the real-estate market is in an above (below) average cycle phase gives reason to expect an 
above (below) average return on real estate at time t+1. Thus, information about today’s re-
turns and the returns in the recent past can be used to obtain better estimates of the returns in 
the near future. Therefore, the returns of real-estate funds can be interpreted to follow a de-
terministic path that is superimposed by a stochastic error term. 
Table 7: Cycle Lengths of Single Funds (01/1975 - 12/2002) 
Funds  Length  Funds  Length 
Aachener Grundfonds Nr. 1  11.25  Grundwert-Fonds  12.92 
Deka-Immobilienfonds  10.67  Haus-Invest  11.00 
DIFA-Fonds Nr. 1  11.00  iii-Fonds Nr. 1  11.33 
Grundbesitz-Invest 
 
11.70 
 
iii-Fonds Nr. 2 
 
10.67 
Notes: Length specifies the length in years of one cycle defined as the time between two consecutive maxima or two 
consecutive minima. 
The analytical instrument to model such series consists of the well-known manifold 
class of Autoregressive-Integrated-Moving-Average [ARIMA(p,d,q)] processes. Fitting these 
models to the data extracts the deterministic component with the residuals representing the 
stochastic error term. Standard tests for unit roots are applied to determine the level of inte-
gration in the time series of each single fund and the real-estate fund index. None of the series -15- 
 
is found to have a unit root
11 and, therefore, simple ARMA(p,q) models are being applied in 
the modelling (i.e. d = 0). Aiming at optimising the fit of the model by using the R
2-criterion, 
as well as the information criteria by Akaike and Schwarz, models with varying lag-lengths p 
and q are estimated for all return series. Table 8 gives an overview about the optimal model 
for the respective series. 
Table 8: ARIMA-Models fitted to the Return Time Series (1/1975 – 12/2002) 
Funds  Model  Funds  Model 
Aachener Grundfonds Nr. 1  AR(1)MA(1)  Grundwert-Fonds  AR(1)MA(1) 
Deka-Immobilienfonds  AR(1)MA(1)  Haus-Invest  AR(1)MA(1) 
DIFA-Fonds Nr. 1  AR(1)AR(12)  iii-Fonds Nr. 1  AR(1)MA(1) 
Grundbesitz-Invest  AR(1)MA(1)  iii-Fonds Nr. 2  AR(1)MA(1) 
 
 
 
 
RE Fund Index 
 
AR(1)AR(12) 
Notes: Fitting models with lagged variables to return time series results in a loss of as many estimated values at the historic end 
as lags included in the model. Therefore, fitting an AR(1)AR(12) model will result in a loss of 12 values, i.e. using time series data from 
1/1975 onwards will lead to the first estimate being available for 1/1976. 
As can be seen, most return series can be adequately modelled using simple 
ARMA(1,1) models. Only the real-estate fund index and the DIFA-Fonds Nr. 1 series are best 
modelled by an AR-only approach, with lag 1 and lag 12 being taken into consideration. This, 
again, may reveal the significance of annual events, such as revaluation for the development 
of returns. 
Assuming that the deterministic trend of the real-estate fund returns is known to an in-
vestor (at least in the short-run), the effective risk, i.e. the uncertainty about future returns, 
only results from the stochastic error term of the modelling, i.e. the residuals. Using adequate 
models, these residuals are mean zero. The effective risk of the investment, thus, corresponds 
to the volatility of these residuals.  
From Table 9, this effective risk is significantly lower than the risk predicted by the un-
conditional (over-all) volatility.  
Table 9: Conditional and Unconditional Volatility of Real-Estate Investments 
  Real-Estate Funds    RE Fund Index 
  Minimum  Median  Maximum     
  (Grundwert-Fonds)  (iii Nr. 2)  (Difa Nr. 1)     
Unconditional  0,27  0,28  0,31    0,20 
Effective  0,25  0,24  0,28    0,17 
?%  -7,41  -14,29  -9,68    -15,00 
Notes: Values represent the monthly volatilities in % of the original return time series (“unconditional”) and of the residuals of 
the ARIMA estimation (“effective”). ?% represents the percentage change of the volatility when considering the effective instead of the 
unconditional volatility. Minimum, median, and maximum refer to the degree of unconditional volatility exhibited by the single funds.  
                                                 
11 Using the ADF test, the null of the time series having a unit root can be rejected at the 1% level for 
nearly every series. For the iii-Fonds Nr. 1 and the DIFA-Fonds Nr. 1 only, this hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Using the KPSS test, however, the null of the time series being stationary cannot be rejected for the two series 
either; therefore, they are considered stationary. -16- 
 
Being able to use the residual instead of the overall volatility will reduce the risk of the real-
estate fund index by 15%. Similar results can also be found for the single funds. The risk of 
the maximum-volatility real-estate fund can be reduced by almost 10% and even the risk of 
the minimum-volatility fund can be reduced by nearly 7.5%. Moreover, sub-period analyses 
show that the effective volatility is more stable than the unconditional volatility. 
3.4  Worst-Case Risk Analysis 
It is understood that measuring investment risk in terms of return volatility can be mis-
leading, since volatility comprises both downward and upward deviations from the mean, and 
therefore, more appropriate gauges are needed to adequately measure downside and especially 
worst-case risk. Traditional worst-case measures include the return minimum and the lower 
return quantiles. Grossman and Zhou (1993) introduced a further measure for downside risk, 
the Maximum Drawdown (MaxDD), which was recently applied to real-estate data by 
Hamelink and Hoesli (2003). The Maximum Drawdown is the (positively defined) maximum 
loss realisable by investing into an asset at a local maximum price and disinvesting at the fol-
lowing local minimum price. The worst-case risk measures for the considered asset classes 
are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10: Worst-Case Measures for Nominal Returns (1/1975 – 12/2002) 
    Real-Estate 
Funds     Cash    Bonds    Stocks 
Panel A: Monthly Returns 
Minimum    -0.19    0.17    -4.38    -25.45 
MaxDD    0.19    -    6.01    40.23 
5% Quantile    0.20    0.21    -1.29    -8.69 
10% Quantile    0.28    0.23    -0.80    -5.72 
Panel B: Yearly Returns 
Minimum    3.29    2.34    -3.00    -44.22 
MaxDD    -    -    3.00    58.50 
10% Quantile    4.63    2.79    0.68    -20.09 
20% Quantile    4.96    3.19    2.85    -7.18 
Notes: Values represent discrete
12 returns in %. MaxDD, the Maximum Drawdown, is the (positively defined) maxi-
mum loss realisable by investing into an asset at a local maximum price and disinvesting at the following local minimum 
price. “-“: Time series does not show any draw-down. 
When looking at monthly returns, as expected, bonds, and especially equities, exhibit 
poor worst-case characteristics compared to real-estate or money market investments. While 
equities showed a minimum return of  –25.45% per month and consecutively lost up to 
40.23%, bonds delivered a return of less than –0.80% in 10% of all months. The real-estate 
fund index, however, only yielded a negative monthly return once. –0.19% is the minimum 
return, as well as the MaxDD. In 95% of all months, the return on real estate was no less than 
0.2%, and in 90% of all months, no less than 0.28%. The money market, on the other hand, 
never produced a negative monthly return, with 0.17% per month being the minimum. The 
                                                 
12 The extreme losses that occurred on the stock market result in log-returns no longer being adequate to 
correctly describe the true returns. Therefore, discrete returns are used in this analysis. -17- 
 
5% quantile of money market returns is slightly higher than that of real estate. Combined with 
the minimum return being well above that of real estate, the probable density of money mar-
ket returns is much steeper on the left-hand side than that of real-estate returns, and thereby 
limits worst-case returns to a much smaller interval. With respect to monthly returns, it can be 
concluded that money market investments are the least risky in a worst-case framework. 
On a yearly basis, however, real estate has always yielded a positive return. With a 
minimum return of 3.29%, no drawdown has occurred over the sampling period. In 80% of all 
cases the yearly return on real estate was not below 4.96%. The money market also did not 
produce a drawdown with the minimum yearly return being 2.34%. Though, in 20% of all 
years the return on the money market was below 3.19%, which still is 0.1% short of the 
minimum yearly return on real estate. Comparing real estate to bonds and equities, this holds 
even stronger. Equities had a minimum yearly return of –44.22%, with a maximum drawdown 
of 58.50%, and in 1 out of 5 years they returned less than –7.18%. Bond returns fell short of 
2.85% in 20% of all years. Therefore, in the context of the worst-case risk measures examined 
here, real-estate investments dominate all other asset classes when analysing yearly returns. 
Looking especially at yearly returns, however, it can be questioned whether the termi-
nology “worst-case risk” is actually adequate when analysing real-estate fund returns. With a 
minimum return significantly above 0, there is no worst case in real-estate fund investments, 
particularly compared to other asset classes. 
3.5  Co-Movements of Real-Estate Funds with Stocks, Bonds and Cash 
3.5.1  Correlation Analysis 
The presence and structure of return interrelationships between different asset classes is 
of crucial importance, e.g. regarding asset allocation decisions.
13 One key measure of overall 
return interdependency is Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient, which quanti-
fies the degree of linear interdependency. Table 11 shows the correlation matrix for short-
term returns of the real-estate fund index, the money, bond, and stock markets. 
The correlation between the real-estate fund index and the DAX, being 0.08, is not sta-
tistically significant different from zero.
14 However, the real-estate fund index shows signifi-
cantly high positive correlations with the money and bond market, while the correlation be-
tween the money and the bond market is not significantly different from zero. This result is 
interesting, insofar as  the correlation between direct real-estate investments and the bond 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Maurer and Reiner (2002). 
14 The analyses in the previous sections showed that some of the time series used in this study are non-
normal distributed and/or auto-correlated. Using a standard t-test for inferring if correlation coefficients are dif-
ferent from zero at a given level of significance is critical, in the presence of non-normal distributed or auto-
correlated time series. Non-normality leads to an unknown distribution of the t-test statistic. To address this item, 
each correlation coefficient, for which both of the underlying series proved to be non-normal (see Pitman, 1937, 
p. 229), was tested with a simple t-test and additionally via a bootstrap BCa confidence interval with 10.000 
bootstrap replications. In almost all cases both test-procedures provided the same conclusions regarding the 
rejection of the null, leading to the presumption that non-normality in the time series used here is less problem-
atic for applying the usual t-test. The serial correlation in one or both of the underlying time series leads to a 
reduction in the degrees of freedom of the t-tests’ t-distribution. To address the item of autocorrelation, espe-
cially in the real-estate fund series, a correction for the t-test suggested by Dawdy and Matalas (1964, p. 8/87) 
was applied, which at least allows for control for first-order autocorrelation. This correction is applied by adjust-
ing the t-tests’ t-statistic, and the degrees of freedom of the t-test-statistics’ t-distribution. -18- 
 
market in Germany are approximately zero.
15 Once more, the high positive correlations be-
tween the real-estate funds and the money and bond market can be at least partly traced back 
to the real-estate funds’ liquidity holdings. 
Table 11: Contemporaneous Correlations for Monthly Nominal Returns (1975 – 2002) 
  Real-Estate 
Fund  
Cash  Bonds  Stocks 
Real-Estate Funds  1       
Money Market  0.60  1     
Bonds  0.45  0.10  1   
Stocks  0.08  0.01  0.13  1 
Notes: Correlation coefficients that proofed to be different from zero, at least at the 5% level, are printed in bold types.  
Shifting to yearly returns, Table 12 shows that the correlations between the real-estate 
fund index and the stock and bond markets, respectively, are hardly altered relative to the 
monthly returns. On the other hand, the yearly correlation between the real-estate fund index 
and the money market, being 0.88, is much higher than in the monthly case. As a modified t-
test showed, the difference between the correlation of the real-estate fund index and the 
money market on monthly and yearly basis is statistically significant at the 5% level. How-
ever, the test was not able to confirm that there is a difference between the monthly and yearly 
correlations of the real-estate fund index and the bond or stock market. 
Table 12: Contemporaneous Correlations for Yearly Nominal Returns (1975 – 2002) 
  Real-Estate 
Funds  Cash  Bonds  Stocks 
Real-Estate Funds  1       
Cash  0.88  1     
Bonds  0.40  0.10  1   
Stocks  0,07  0.02  0.14  1 
Notes: Correlation coefficients that proved to be different from zero, at least at the 5% level, are printed in bold types.  
As shown earlier, real-estate investment fund returns exhibit cyclical behaviour, which 
could lead to an unstable correlation structure. To examine the stability of the correlation 
structure, short, m edium, and long-term rolling correlations were calculated, i.e. the whole 
time period comprising 336 months was divided in 313, 277, and 217, overlapping sub-
periods of 24, 60, and 120 months length, respectively. After that, correlation coefficients 
were calculated for each sub-period. In Table 13, the mean and standard deviation of the 24, 
60, and 120 months correlation coefficients are tabulated.  
Obviously, short-term correlations between the real-estate fund index and the other as-
set classes are relatively volatile, i.e. relatively unstable. Nonetheless, the longer the sub-
period length, the more stable the correlations. Especially, the long-term (120 months) corre-
lations between the real-estate fund index and all other asset classes are much less volatile, i.e. 
                                                 
15 Maurer, Reiner, and Sebastian (2003) showed that for the US, UK, and Germany correlations between 
aggregated level direct real-estate investments and the bond markets are near zero. -19- 
 
more stable over time, than the 24-month correlations. However, it should also be mentioned 
again, that this stabilizing effect of longer sub-periods should be interpreted carefully. The 
stabilizing is also partly due to larger overlapping when considering longer sub-periods.  
Interestingly, the mean correlations between the real-estate fund index and the stock and 
bond markets, respectively, seem to be quite unaffected by the sub-period length. On the other 
hand, the mean correlations between the real-estate fund index and the money market are con-
siderably increasing, the longer the chosen sub-period length. While the mean 24-month cor-
relation between the real-estate fund index and the money market is 0.35, it increases to 0.48 
and 0.58 when shifting to 60 and 120-month correlations, respectively. Again the relations 
between the money market and the real-estate funds are qualitatively and quantitatively dif-
ferent from the relations between the stock/bond markets and the real-estate fund index.  
Table 13: Rolling Correlations for Monthly Nominal Returns (1975 – 2002) 
        24 months    60 months    120 months 
Mean    0.35    0.48    0.58  Cash 
STD    0.20    0.12    0.08 
Mean    0.52    0.53    0.49 
Bonds 
STD    0.19    0.13    0.06 
Mean    0.12    0.13    0.12 
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Exhibit 3: Rolling Correlations for 24-Month Sub-Periods on the Basis of Monthly 
Nominal Returns (1975 – 2002) 
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Real-Estate Fund Index vs. Stock Market (DAX)
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Despite the relatively low volatility, i.e. stability, of long-term correlations, the graphs 
in  Exhibit 4 demonstrate that there are slight changes in the correlation structure over time. 
These changes seem to be more of systematic than of random nature. Long-term correlations 
between the real-estate fund index and the stock market fairly decreasing over the whole time 
period. Moreover, the correlations between the real-estate fund index and the bond and money 
market, respectively, increased in the last two decades, even if there is evidence for the corre-
lation between the real-estate fund index and the money market to recently decrease. 
Exhibit 4: Rolling Correlations for 120 Months of Monthly Returns (1975 – 2002) 
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To formally test the stability of the correlation structure, the correlations between the 
real-estate fund index and the other asset classes in four non-overlapping sub-periods of equal 
length were calculated and tabulated in Table 14.  
Table 14: Contemporaneous Correlations for Monthly Nominal  
Returns in Different Sub-Periods 
Real-Estate Funds 
versus  Cash  Bonds  Stocks 
1975-1981  0.58  0.41  0.06 
1982-1988  0.51  0.48  0.23 
1989-1995  0.57  0.47  0.08 
1996-2002  0.36  0.67  -0.05 
As is apparent from the previous analysis and Table 14, the monthly correlations be-
tween the real-estate fund index and the other asset classes are, in part, considerably dissimi-
lar in different time periods. Especially the correlation in the period of 1996-2002, for the 
money market and the bond market, and the sub-period 1982-1988 for the stock market are 
considerably different from the other sub-periods. However, a pair-wise comparison of the 
different sub-period correlation coefficients, via a modified t-test, was only able to detect a 
5% significant difference in one case. This was the correlation of the real-estate fund index 
and the bond market, in the first versus the last sub-period. -21- 
 
3.5.2  Residual Return Correlations 
As shown earlier, the real-estate fund and the money market one-full-period returns are 
only partly of stochastic nature. As cyclical analysis suggests, these one-month returns can be 
separated in a deterministic and a stochastic component. Table 15 shows the correlation coef-
ficients after removing the deterministic return component from the real-estate fund index and 
money market returns.  
Table 15: Contemporaneous Correlations for Monthly Nominal (Residual) Returns  
(1975 – 2002) 
  Real-Estate 
Funds  Cash  Bonds  Stocks 
Real-Estate Funds  1       
Cash  0.21  1     
Bonds  0.42  0.04  1   
Stocks  0.05  0.01  0.13  1 
Notes: Correlation coefficients that proved to be different from zero - at least at the 5% level - are printed in bold types.  
It is obvious that the correlations between the pure stochastic return component of the 
real-estate fund index and the stock and bond market returns, respectively, are nearly the same 
for full returns. However, the correlation between the real-estate fund index and the money 
market is much lower after eliminating the deterministic return components from both indi-
ces. While the correlation for the full returns was 0.60 (see Table 11), the correlation for the 
pure stochastic return components is only 0.21. This finding is interesting, insofar as it indi-
cates that the high (full return) correlation between the real-estate investment funds and the 
money market seems to be mainly driven by deterministic developments, i.e. pro-cyclical be-
haviour between the real-estate funds and the money market. 
3.5.3  Co-Movements in Stress Situations 
As observable especially for stock and bond markets, co-movements between different 
assets are often stronger in extreme situations, such as financial market crises, than under 
normal conditions. Economically, this implies that diversification potentials in stress situa-
tions are often of lower magnitude than under normal conditions. To address this important 
issue, this section only analyses return co-movements in the tails of the total bivariate return 
distributions. Due to the limited availability of data, the key focus will be on probabilities, 
rather than on co-movement structures.
16  
To measure the co-movement of two random variables in some part of their bivariate 
distribution, without considering the structure of the co-movement, the concept of conditional 
probability proves useful. One can define LCP(c):= P(X = x c | Y = y c) as the (conditional) 
probability that a random variable X (here, real-estate fund index returns) has a realisation 
equal to, or below, its c%-percentile under the condition that, at the same time, another ran-
dom variable Y (here, money, stock, and bond market returns, respectively) has a realisation 
equal to, or below, its c%- percentile. UCP := P(X = xc | Y = yc) can be defined equivalently. 
If X and Y are two independent random variables, the conditional probability LCP(c) := P(X 
                                                 
16 Determining the structure of dependency in the tails of a bivariate distribution requires higher fre-
quency data than available here. For structural measures of extreme dependencies see Malevergne and Sornette 
(2002). -22- 
 
= xc | Y = yc) is equal to the absolute probability P(X = xc) that X has a realisation below, or 
equal to, xc, and equivalently, P(X = xc | Y = yc) = P(X = xc). The LCP(c) and UCP(c) do not, 
per se, allow for inferences about the statistical dependence and independence of two random 
variables. Nevertheless, LCP(c) and UCP(c) are useful measures to quantify the risk and op-
portunity that, e.g., given that one asset market is in bad (good) condition, the other is too. 
The conditional probabilities, LCP(c) and UCP(c), can be estimated through the corre-
sponding conditional frequencies, eLCP(c) and eUCP(c). It should be mentioned that the 
e.CP’s are estimations of the true .CP’s. Due to the small monthly database, these estimations 
have high standard errors. So, the eCP’s should be interpreted carefully.  
In Table 16, the (conditional) relative frequencies for the considered real-estate fund in-
dex returns are tabulated to be equal to, or lower (higher) than, their 5%, 50%, 90%, and 95% 
percentile returns, under the condition that the corresponding stock and bond market returns 
respectively satisfy the same conditions.  
As can be seen from Table 16, the eLCP (10) and eLCP (5) for the real-estate fund in-
dex are of considerable magnitude, depending on the bond market, i.e. in months where the 
bond market returns are low to very low, there is also a considerably high probability that the 
real-estate fund index returns are also relatively low to very low. In other words, open-ended 
real-estate funds often cannot provide a perfect alternative investment in times of poor bond 
market performance.  
Table 16: Conditional Relative Frequencies in Several Percentiles of the Monthly Nomi-
nal Real-Estate Funds Index Return Distribution (1975 - 2002) 
  eLCP(5%)  eLCP(10%)    eUCP(10%)  eUCP(5%) 
Cash  0.00  15.15    20.59  22.22 
Bonds  23.53  33.33    26.47  27.78 
Stocks  5.88  12.12    23.53  11.11 
Notes: All numbers are in percent. 
Interestingly, despite the high correlation between the real-estate fund index and the 
money market (see Table 11), the eLCPs are low. The probability of a poor or very poor real-
estate fund performance is low to zero, if the money market performs poorly or very poorly. 
In other words, in times of poor money market performance, real-estate funds may provide an 
alternative investment. Nearly the same can also be observed, if the real-estate fund index 
returns are conditioned on the stock market returns.  
No significant difference can be observed for the eUCP(10%)s, and eUCP(5%)s, i.e. the 
relative frequencies that the real-estate fund index performance is good or very good, condi-
tioned on a good or very good money, bond, or stock market performance. All eUCP(10%)s 
and eUCP(5%)s are about 25%, which indicates that there is a considerable probability for a 
good or very good real-estate fund performance if the money, bond, or stock market perform-
ance is also good or very good. The only exception is the eUCP(5%) conditioned on the stock 
market, which is about 11%. 
Again, a consideration of the purely random component of the real-estate fund index re-
turns and money market returns carried out in Table 17 shows interesting changes, relative to 
the case of full returns. -23- 
 
Table 17: Conditional Relative Frequencies in Several Percentiles of the Monthly Nomi-
nal Real-Estate Fund Index Residual Return Distribution (1975 - 2002) 
  eLCP(5%)  eLCP(10%)    eUCP(10%)  eUCP(5%) 
Cash  29.41  36.11    42.86  21.05 
Bonds  17.65  32.35    37.14  33.33 
Stocks  17.65  8.82    22.86  0.00 
Notes: All numbers are in percent. For the real-estate funds index returns and the money market returns the (AR) residual time series 
was used.  
Obviously, while the full return eLCPs for the real-estate fund index returns conditioned 
on the money market were relatively low, they are much higher considering the pure random 
components of returns only. eLCP(10%) and eLCP(5%) are now 36.11% and 29.41%, respec-
tively, indicating that there is actually a substantially higher probability for poor or very poor 
real-estate fund index performance, if money market performance is also poor or very poor.  
Also noteworthy is the very high eUCP(10%) of the pure random return component of 
the real-estate fund index conditioned on the bond markets’ pure random return component. 
While the eUCP(10%) for full returns was 20.59%, it increases significantly to 42.86%, using 
only the pure random component of returns. The same can be observed for the eUCP(10%) of 
the pure random component of the real-estate fund index returns that are conditioned on the 
bond market. 
4  Analysis of Long-Term Returns 
4.1  Motivation 
Analysing monthly and yearly returns, the previous sections showed that real-estate 
funds exhibit return characteristics that are different to that of other asset classes. Addition-
ally, it was shown that real-estate funds are, to some extent, linked to the bond and money 
market. Furthermore, the short-term risk/return profile of investments in the money market is 
somehow similar to that of real-estate funds. Consequently, this section deals with two other 
important issues: first, the risk/return characteristics of real-estate fund investments for a 
long-term investor, and second, the possibility of tracking these long-term risk/return charac-
teristics through simple portfolio strategies, using cash and bonds. 
In the context of long-term investments, inflation is a main factor that negatively affects 
future consumption possibilities implied by an investment. Especially for pension invest-
ments, identifying assets that offer “insurance” against inflation risk is important, because 
they support a stable standard of living in the long run. Therefore, the following analyses will 
be based on real returns. 
 For analysing long-term risk/return characteristics of real-estate fund investments and 
replication possibilities, the multi-period development of real-estate funds, the money market, 
and bond market are considered in ex ante and ex post frameworks. More concretely, the risk 
and return development for the different asset categories, for holding periods between one and 
twenty years, are computed and compared with each other. We assume a buy-and-hold lump 
sum investment, i.e. rebalancing is not possible within the investment horizon. -24- 
 
Despite the traditional risk measure variance, the main focus is on shortfall risk meas-
ures. The use of such risk measures for evaluating the risk of the different investments is in 
line with other research, and with conventional wisdom.
17 Shortfall risk is associated with the 
possibility of “something bad happening”, i.e. falling below a required target return. Returns 
below the target (losses) are considered to be undesirable or risky, while returns above the 
target (gains) are desirable or non-risky. Therefore, shortfall risk measures are called “rela-
tive” or “pure” measures of risk.  
One key shortfall risk measure used here is the shortfall probability. In our context, let 
r0(k) be the cumulative continuously compounded real return of a lump sum investment, start-
ing at time t = 0 and ending at time t = k. Then the shortfall probability, SP, of the investment 
is defined as 
  SP( r0(k) ) = Prob[ r0(k) < z0(k) ],  (3) 
where z0(k) is the target (benchmark) return, which divides the total possible investment 
returns into gains or losses. In the following, z0(k) = 0, i.e., risk is understood as losing the 
status quo of the real consumption level attainable at the beginning of the investment horizon 
(consumption shortfall).  
Despite the popularity of this risk measure in the investment industry, it has the major 
shortcoming that it “completely ignores how large the potential shortfall might be” (c.f. Bodie 
2001, p. 308). If the same investment strategy can be repeated many times, the shortfall prob-
ability only answers the question “how often” a loss might occur, but not “how bad” such a 
loss might be. 
To provide information about the potential extent of a loss, we calculate the Mean Ex-
cess Loss (MEL) as an additional measure. Formally, this risk index also, known as condi-
tional shortfall expectation, is defined as 
  MEL( r0(k) ) = E[ z0(k) - r0(k) | r0(k) < z0(k)]        (4) 
and it indicates the expected loss with respect to the benchmark, under the condition 
that a shortfall occurs. Therefore, given a loss, the MEL answers the question “how bad on 
average” the loss will be.
18 In this sense, the MEL can be considered a worst case-risk meas-
ure, since the measure only considers the consequences of the mean shortfall-level assuming 
that a shortfall happens. 
A shortfall risk measure which connects the probability and the extent of the conditional 
shortfall in an intuitive way is the shortfall expectation (SE): 
                                                 
17 The concept of shortfall risk was introduced in finance by Roy (1952) and Kataoka (1963), and ex-
panded and theoretically justified by Bawa (1975) and Fishburn (1977, 1982, 1984). It was widely applied to 
asset allocation by Leibowitz and Kogelman (1991) and used by Asness (1996), Bodie (1995), Butler and Domian 
(1991), Leibowitz and Krasker (1988) or Zimmermann (1991, 1993) to judge the long-term risk of stocks and 
bonds. Additionally,  Mao (1970), Libby and Fishburn (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Laughhuun, 
Payne and Crum (1980) and March and Shapira (1987) show that, in empirical decision-making, many indi-
viduals judge the risk of an alternative, relative to a reference point. In real-estate literature,  Sing and Ong 
(2000), and Maurer and Reiner (2002) employ the downside risk framework to the asset allocation decision with 
stocks, bonds and real estate. 
18   The MEL is closely connected with the Tail Conditional Expectation, which is given by TCE = E(R‰R 
< z) = z – MEL. The TCE has some favourable features, e.g. it is (in contrast to the shortfall probabil-
ity) a coherent risk measure with respect to the axioms developed by Artzner et al. (1999). -25- 
 
  SE( r0(k) ) = E[max{z0(k) - r0(k), 0}] = SP*MEL  (5) 
The shortfall expectation is the probability-weighted sum of all potential shortfalls, and 
therefore, a measure of the unconditional „average loss“. As equation (3) shows, the mean 
shortfall level is simply the product of the shortfall probability and the mean level of shortfall 
given the occurrence of a shortfall. 
In the remainder, for holding periods from one to twenty years, the risk and return char-
acteristics of a buy-and-hold lump sum real-estate fund investment are evaluated assuming 
full reinvestment in the various index portfolios.  
Beside management fees, investments in real-estate and other funds cause additional 
purchasing transaction costs, especially front-end loads, which reduce the terminal returns. 
Particularly for shorter holding periods, assuming zero transaction costs can lead to delusive 
results. To account for this problem, we assume purchasing transaction costs proportional to 
an assets’ initial unit price of 5% for real-estate fund and stock market investments, 3% for a 
bond market investment, and 0% for a money market investment. The various purchasing 
transaction costs are subtracted from the holding period returns.  
4.2  Ex Post Analysis 
For the historical (ex post) analyses the mean returns and risk measures for the different 
investments are calculated solely from historical data over different (overlapping) investment 
period lengths. Thus, the ex post analysis does not make any explicit assumptions about the 
random patterns of returns.  
Technically, the total period under consideration from 1975 to 2002 was divided into 28 
(non-overlapping) one-year periods, 27 (overlapping) two-year periods, and so forth, ending 
with 8 (overlapping) twenty-year investment periods. Assuming a lump sum investment in the 
various portfolios under consideration at the beginning of each period, the cumulative real 
return of the initial investment was calculated for each possible period. Subsequently, using 
these historical cumulative returns of the respective investments, the mean return and the risk 
measures for the different investment alternatives for every specific period length can be 
computed. The results are presented in Table 18. 
Table 18 shows that real-estate funds exhibit, on average, negative real returns and a 
high shortfall probability (78.57%) for one-year investment horizons. Both result from the 
relatively high purchasing transaction costs of real-estate funds. Nevertheless, for two-year 
and longer holding periods, the mean real return of real-estate funds is positive and increas-
ing. Due to the relatively low return fluctuations, the shortfall probability, shortfall expecta-
tion, and mean excess loss for real-estate funds are rapidly decreasing, when shifting to longer 
holding period lengths. For four-year and longer holding periods, the shortfall probability and 
shortfall expectation, calculated from the historical data, are zero. 
Comparing the money, bond, and stock market investments with the real-estate fund in-
vestment, it is obvious that the money market investment exhibits for shorter holding period 
lengths higher, and for longer holding period lengths lower mean returns than the real-estate 
funds. For five-year holding periods, the effect of having higher transaction costs for real-
estate funds than for a money market investment is overcompensated by the higher mean re-
turns of real-estate funds. Thus, for five-year and longer holding periods, the mean real return 
of real-estate funds is higher than the mean real return of the money market investment. The 
bond market investment, on the other hand, and especially the stock market investment, pro-
vide higher mean returns for all holding period lengths than the real-estate fund investment. -26- 
 
All-in-all, the long-term mean return of real-estate funds is between the mean real return of 
the money and bond market investment. 
Table 18: Ex Post Risk and Return Profiles of Cumulative Real Returns (in %) for  
Different Holding Period Lengths (Target Return: Zero) 
Investment Horizon (years)  1  2  3  4  5  10  15  20 
                   
Mean  -1.48  2.04  5.61  9.28  13.09  33.95  53.98  71.75 
STD  1.63  2.83  3.95  4.95  5.79  6.60  6.48  4.50 
SP  78.57  25.93  15.38  0  0  0  0  0 
SE  1.28  0.11  0.02  0  0  0  0  0 
Real-Estate Funds 
MEL  1.62  0.43  0.12  -  -  -  -  - 
                   
Mean  2.33  4.80  7.39  10.11  12.99  28.62  43.59  56.41 
STD  1.60  2.84  3.83  4.65  5.24  5.64  5.71  2.56 
SP  7.14  3.70  3.85  4.00  0  0  0  0 
SE  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  0  0  0  0 
Money Market 
MEL  0.04  0.04  0.02  < 0.01  -  -  -  - 
                   
Mean  1.30  5.36  9.35  13.14  17.38  40.81  60.55  83.33 
STD  5.39  7.67  9.69  10.75  10.92  5.63  11.25  8.23 
SP  35.71  22.22  15.38  12.00  8.33  0  0  0 
SE  0.61  0.31  0.17  0.07  0.01  0  0  0 
Bond Market 
MEL  1.71  1.41  1.11  0.60  0.16  -  -  - 
                   
Mean  1.51  9.51  19.32  29.95  39.90  90.79  131.55  185.84 
STD  26.11  36.38  41.05  43.25  45.74  31.03  36.89  41.72 
SP  39.29  44.44  26.92  24.00  29.17  0.00  0.00  0.00 
SE  3.62  4.52  1.96  1.27  1.27  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Stock Market 
MEL  9.21  10.16  7.29  5.31  4.35  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes: All numbers are in percent. Average cumulative real return (Mean), volatility (STD), and shortfall risk measures of the dif-
ferent investments are calculated for holding periods between one and twenty years in the 1975/01 – 2002/12 period. SP is the shortfall 
probability, MEL is the mean excess loss, and SE is the shortfall expectation. Target return for the different shortfall risk measures is zero, 
i.e. here, a shortfall is defined as a negative real return. Front-end loads: 3% for bonds, 0% for money market, and 5% for real-estate funds 
and stocks. 
Considering investment risk, the money market investment exhibits a much lower short-
fall probability for one to three-year holding periods than the real-estate fund investment, 
which is also true for the shortfall expectation and mean excess loss. However even if the 
shortfall expectation and mean excess loss of the money market investments are very low for 
four-year holding periods, there is still a shortfall probability of 4%, while this was zero for 
the real-estate funds investment. The bond market investment displays high and persistent 
shortfall probabilities, shortfall expectations, and mean excess losses up to five-year or longer 
holding periods, which is also the case for the stock market investment. Additionally, the 
stock market investment shows relatively high shortfall probabilities and mean excess losses 
up to at least 5 years. 
4.3  Ex Ante Analyses 
4.3.1  Real Capital Maintenance 
Although the ex post approach is common in studies about the risk and return character-
istics of long-term investments, there is a fundamental drawback in applying this methodol-
ogy. The holding period returns are derived - except for holding periods of one year - from 
overlapping periods. Therefore, the observed historical long-term holding period returns can--27- 
 
not be regarded as independent sample observations. Especially for small samples (i.e. long 
investment periods), the use of overlapping holding period returns can produce a considerable 
bias in estimating risk measures. The use of independent investment periods provides a better 
way to estimate risk measures from historical data. But the existing return history is generally 
too short to obtain a sufficient data basis, especially for long-term investment periods.  
A possible solution to this problem is to specify an exogenous structure on the ex ante 
probability distribution, governing the financial uncertainty of future returns. The parameters 
to fit such a model can subsequently be estimated from historical (e.g., yearly) observations of 
real returns. With such a model, it is possible to look into the future and compute the risk 
measures we are interested in. 
Applying several normality and serial correlation tests to the yearly real returns for the 
stock and bond market, neither deviations from normality and nor serial correlation could be 
detected on a statistically reliable level of confidence. Thus we assume that the real values of 
the bond and stock market investments can be modelled as a Geometric Brownian Motion, 
which is standard in financial economics and can be traced back to Bachellier (1900). This 
implies, that one-year real log returns rt are iid, and normally distributed with parameters µ 
and s. Assuming purchasing transaction costs of a > 0 are proportional to the initial unit price 
of an asset at time t = 0, the mapping from single-period log returns to k-period real log return 
r0(k) = S rt – ln(1+a) is straightforward, since all means and variances are scaled up by the 
same factor k. This implies that the multi-year real log return is normally distributed  
  r0(k) ~ N[µ0(k) , s0(k)],  (4) 
with an expected return µ0(k) and standard deviation s0(k): 
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On the other hand, for the yearly real log returns for money market and real-estate fund 
investments, statistically significant positive first order serial correlation can be observed (see 
Table 6). Thus we assume that the continuous real returns of the money market and real-estate 
funds can be modelled through an AR(1)-processes with normal distributed residuals, i.e. rt = 
c + d · rt-1 + et, with et ~ N(0 , se). Hence, the continuously compounded one-year real returns 
rt are also normally distributed with parameters µ = c/(1-d) and s = [s e
2/(1-d
2)]
½. Considering 
again purchasing transaction costs of a > 0 proportional to the initial unit price of an asset at 
time t = 0, the continuously compounded (multi-year) real return r0(k) = S rt – ln(1+a) is, 
again, normally distributed with: 
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Since the multi-year real returns of all investments under consideration are assumed to 
be (multivariate) normally distributed, closed-form solutions for all shortfall risk measures 
applied here can be found. For the shortfall-probability, the closed-form solution is: 
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where mn = [z0(k) - µ0(k)] / s 0(k) and f denotes the cumulative density function of the standard 
normal distribution. If f is the density function of the standard normal distribution, the short-
fall expectation (see Winkler, Roodman and Britney, 1972) is:  
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ] ) ( ) ( [ ) ) ( ( SE 0 0 0 0 n n m k m k z k z k r j s ￿ + F ￿ - = .  (8) 
Finally, combining equations (9) and (10) generates the mean excess loss expression:  
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To estimate the required parameters, the sequence { rt }t = 1,...,T of continuous one-year 
real returns (before purchasing transaction costs) was used.  
In the case of the bond and stock market investment, we assumed a Geometric 
Brownian Motion. The real continuous returns rt ~ N(µ, s) are iid normally distributed. Thus, 
the required parameters can be estimated by their sample counterparts, i.e., the arithmetic 
sample mean and the adjusted sample standard deviation of yearly real continuous returns as 
reported in Table 2. 
For the yearly real continuous returns of the real-estate fund and money market invest-
ment, an AR(1)-model was assumed: rt = c + d · rt-1 + et, with et ~ N(0, se). For the real-estate 
funds’ yearly real continuous returns, we estimated: c = 0.017, d = 0.502, and se = 1.32%. For 
the yearly money market real log returns, we estimated c = 0.009, d = 0.601, and se = 1.15%. 
In Table 19 the real mean return, real volatility and the different shortfall risk measures 
(target real return is zero) for the respective buy-and-hold lump-sum investments are tabu-
lated.  
If the shortfall probability is stressed as risk measure, the risk of missing real capital 
maintenance decreases monotonously with an increasing investment period for all invest-
ments under consideration. However, the rate and extent of the risk reduction differs noticea-
bly among the investments. Due to relatively high transaction costs of real-estate funds, com-
pared to their relatively  low yearly mean real return, real-estate funds exhibit a very high 
shortfall probability (83.3%) for one-year investment horizons. Nonetheless, the shortfall 
probability decreases rapidly for longer investment horizons and is lower than 1% for invest-
ment periods of five years and longer. 
In contrast to the shortfall probability, the mean excess loss (MEL), for two-year and 
longer holding periods of all investment opportunities, increases steadily with the length of 
the investment period. This increase is slight for the real-estate fund investment, which exhib-
its a MEL of about 1.6% for two-year holding periods, and about 1.8% for twenty-year hold-
ing periods. For the money and bond market investment, the increase in MEL is moderate. 
While the money (bond) market investment exhibits a MEL of about 0.6% (3.9%) for one-
year holding periods, this increases to about 2.9% (6.2%) for twenty-year holding periods. For 
the stock market investment, the increase of MEL through longer holding periods is high. The 
MEL is about 20.3% for an investment period of one year, while for a holding period of 
twenty years, this risk metric increases to about 60.1%. Hence, with respect to the magnitude 
of a potential shortfall, the popular argument that stocks are less risky in the long run than in 
the short is not true. This result concurs with the work of Samuelson (1963) about the fallacy 
of large numbers for the investment risk in the long run.  
Regarding the shortfall expectation of the real-estate fund and bond market investment, 
the shortfall expectation gradually decreases with the length of the investment period. On the -29- 
 
other hand, for the money and stock market investment, the shortfall probability increases for 
holding periods up to approximately 10 and 8 years respectively, and decreases thereafter. 
This is what Leibowitz and Krasker (1988) called risk-persistence (i.e., even for long-time 
horizons), the shortfall expectation remains at a substantially high level. In other words, the 
decreasing shortfall probability is (nearly) perfectly offset by an increasing conditional ex-
pected loss, if the length of the holding period increases. In contrast, the shortfall expectation 
for real-estate funds is close to zero if the holding period is longer than three years. 
Table 19: Ex Ante Risk and Return Profiles of Cumulative Real Returns (in %)  
for Different Holding Period Lengths (Target Return: 0% p.a.) 
Investment Horizon (years)  1  2  3  4  5  10  15  20 
                   
Mean  -1.48  1.92  5.33  8.73  12.13  29.14  46.15  63.16 
STD  1.53  2.65  3.59  4.39  5.10  7.81  9.81  11.46 
SP  83.33  23.36  6.87  2.35  0.87  0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01 
SE  1.61  0.36  0.11  0.04  0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01 
Real-Estate Funds 
MEL  1.93  1.55  1.58  1.65  1.70  1.86  1.87  1.80 
                   
Mean  2.33  4.66  6.99  9.32  11.65  23.30  34.96  46.61 
STD  1.44  2.57  3.55  4.42  5.20  8.20  10.42  12.24 
SP  5.23  3.48  2.46  1.75  1.25  0.22  0.04  0.01 
SE  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01 
Money Market 
MEL  0.60  1.02  1.34  1.60  1.80  2.42  2.70  2.86 
                   
Mean  1.30  5.56  9.82  14.07  18.33  39.62  60.90  82.19 
STD  5.39  7.62  9.33  10.78  12.05  17.04  20.87  24.09 
SP  40.46  23.28  14.64  9.58  6.41  1.00  0.18  0.03 
SE  1.56  1.04  0.70  0.48  0.34  0.06  0.01  < 0.01 
Bond Market 
MEL  3.86  4.45  4.81  5.06  5.25  5.77  6.03  6.17 
                   
Mean  1.51  7.90  14.29  20.68  27.07  59.03  90.98  122.93 
STD  26.11  36.93  45.23  52.23  58.39  82.58  101.14  116.78 
SP  47.69  41.53  37.60  34.60  32.14  23.74  18.42  14.62 
SE  9.68  11.12  11.79  12.11  12.22  11.51  10.16  8.79 
Stock Market 
MEL  20.30  26.77  31.36  34.99  38.01  48.47  55.19  60.12 
Notes: All numbers are in percent. Average cumulative real return (Mean), volatility (STD), and shortfall risk measures of the dif-
ferent investments are calculated for holding periods between one and twenty years. SP is the shortfall probability, MEL is the mean excess 
loss, and SE is the shortfall expectation. Target return for the different shortfall risk measures is zero, i.e. here a shortfall is defined as a 
negative real return. Front-end loads: 3% for bonds, 0% for money market, and 5% for real-estate funds and stocks. 
Interestingly, if comparing the risk and return profile of the real-estate fund and money 
market investment, it can be seen that for shorter holding periods, i.e. one, two, and three 
years, there is a risk/return dominance of the money market investment. For these holding 
period lengths, the money market investment provides higher mean returns and lower risk 
(STD, SP, SE, MEL) than the real-estate fund investment. However for five-year and longer 
holding periods, the dominance relation is vice versa. Now the real-estate fund investment 
dominates the money market investment. 
A comparison of the ex post results (Table 18) with the ex ante results (Table 19) shows 
that for short-term investment horizons, the ex ante risk measures do not differ significantly 
from their ex post counterparts. Nevertheless, the differences between ex ante and ex post 
shortfall-risk become larger within an increasing investment period. Therefore, employing 
overlapping historical return series substantially u nderestimates the level of volatility and 
shortfall risk in the long run. -30- 
 
4.3.2  Real Capital Growth 
The previous analyses considered shortfall risk relative to the target of real capital main-
tenance. While real capital maintenance is a natural reference point for investors, the different 
investment alternatives showed considerable risk in missing this target. Additionally, since 
1981, a growing market for inflation-linked bonds exists. These bonds are comparable with 
conventional bonds, however the interest rate and/or maturity value are fixed in real terms, i.e. 
these bonds guarantee a positive real interest rate. This raises the question about shortfall risk 
relative to a no-risk positive real return target. To study the effects of such a positive real re-
turn target, the shortfall probability, shortfall expectation, and mean excess loss of the differ-
ent investments relative to the real target 1.5% p.a. have been tabulated in Table 20. 
Table 20: Ex Ante Risk Profiles of Cumulative Real Returns (in %) for  
Different Holding Period Lengths (Target Return: 1.5% p.a.) 
Investment Horizon (years)  1  2  3  4  5  10  15  20 
                   
Real-Estate Funds  SP  97.40  65.46  40.52  26.39  17.92  3.40  0.76  0.18 
  SE  2.98  1.66  1.04  0.70  0.50  0.10  0.02  0.01 
  MEL  3.06  2.54  2.57  2.67  2.76  3.08  3.23  3.32 
                   
Money Market  SP  27.89  25.62  23.87  22.33  20.91  15.24  11.28  8.46 
  SE  0.25  0.40  0.50  0.57  0.61  0.65  0.57  0.47 
  MEL  0.89  1.55  2.09  2.55  2.94  4.26  5.06  5.61 
                   
Bond Market  SP  51.39  36.74  28.32  22.56  18.31  7.33  3.23  1.48 
  SE  2.24  1.92  1.64  1.41  1.20  0.56  0.26  0.13 
  MEL  4.37  5.23  5.80  6.23  6.56  7.60  8.16  8.53 
                   
Stock Market  SP  49.97  44.70  41.40  38.90  36.84  29.65  24.86  21.25 
  SE  10.41  12.40  13.55  14.29  14.78  15.47  14.98  14.10 
  MEL  20.83  27.75  32.74  36.75  40.13  52.18  60.23  66.32 
Notes: All numbers are in percent. The shortfall risk measures of the different investments are calculated for holding periods be-
tween one and twenty years. SP is the shortfall probability, MEL is the mean excess loss, and SE is the shortfall expectation. Target return 
for the different shortfall risk measures is 1.5% p.a. Front-end loads: 3% for bonds, 0% for money market, and 5% for real-estate funds and 
stocks. 
Considering first the shortfall probability, it is clear that higher target returns lead to 
higher shortfall probabilities for all investments and all holding period lengths than was the 
case for the zero target. Additionally, the effect of decreasing shortfall probabilities for longer 
investment periods is much less than before. However, both effects of having a higher return 
target return are noticeably different for the various investments.  
While the shortfall probabilities for the stock market investment are only slightly al-
tered, the changes for the bond market are more apparent, yet still moderate. The strongest 
changes can be observed for the money market investment. For this, the shortfall probability 
for one-year investment horizons rise from approximately 5.2% to 27.9% for the target 1.5% 
real return. Additionally, the decrease of shortfall probabilities for longer holding periods is 
much weaker than for the other investments. For twenty-year holding periods the money mar-
ket investment still exhibits a shortfall probability of about 8.5%, which was about 0% before. 
The effect of the higher real return target on the shortfall probability of the real-estate fund 
investment is also considerable strong, even if the effect is still weaker than for the money 
market investment. The shortfall probability for the real-estate fund investment is now 97.4% 
for one-year investment horizons, and rapidly decreases to about 0.2% for twenty-year in-
vestment horizons. -31- 
 
Considering the mean excess loss, using the target 1.5% real return consequently leads 
to higher MEL for all investments and all holding period lengths. Again the relative increase 
is comparably low for the stock and bond market investment, and relatively high for the 
money market and real-estate funds investment. The one-year holding period MEL for the 
real-estate funds increases by approximately 59% to the magnitude of 3.06%, the twenty-year 
holding period MEL increases about 84% to the magnitude of 3.32%. Despite this relatively 
high increase the MEL for the real-estate fund and money market investment is much lower 
than for the bond and especially the stock market investment. 
Finally, the shortfall expectation of the different investments for all holding periods is 
higher than in the case of target zero. Again, the shortfall expectations for the stock and bond 
market investment are slightly altered. One the other hand, the shortfall expectation for the 
money market and real-estate fund investment, even so they are still relatively low, exhibit a 
relatively high increase for all holding periods. Additionally, although, in the case of the zero 
target, the shortfall expectation for the money market investment decreased for two-year and 
longer holding periods, it now increases for holding periods up to ten years. 
4.4  Replicability the of Real-Estate Fund Performance 
The previous sections showed that, for most holding period lengths, the bond market in-
vestment provided higher returns - accompanied by higher risk - than the real-estate funds. On 
the other hand, for short-term holding periods, the real-estate funds showed inferior risk re-
turn profiles relative to the money market, while the real-estate fund investment for medium 
and longer holding periods performed better. However, the weak short-holding period per-
formance of real-estate funds is rather a consequence of the relatively high front-end loads 
than of low returns. 
Now the following questions arise: can the risk return profile of real-estate funds be rep-
licated by combined money and bond market investments? Which effect could lower front-
end loads for real-estate funds have? 
For this purpose, three simple buy-and-hold portfolios are considered with 25%/75% 
(portfolio 1), 50%/50% (portfolio 2), and 75%/25% (portfolio 3) i nvestment weights in 
cash/bonds, respectively. The purchasing transaction costs for these portfolios are set to the 
weighted average of the purchasing transaction costs of a single money and bond market in-
vestment. These portfolios are compared by ex ante analyses with a pure real-estate funds 
investment, assuming again a 1.5% p.a. target real return for evaluating the shortfall risk 
measures. The results are given in Table 21.  
Comparing the three simple replication portfolios with the 5% front-end load real-estate 
funds investment, it is obvious that none of the portfolios are able to simultaneously track the 
short and long-term risk/return profile of the funds investment exactly. Portfolio 1, which 
mainly consists of money market investments, exhibits lower shortfall risk (measured by SP, 
SE, and MEL) for holding period lengths, than the real-estate funds investment. Furthermore, 
portfolio 1 has also higher mean returns up to 5-year investment horizons; it also, however, 
has a higher volatility up to 3-year holding period lengths. Conversely, for holding periods 
longer than 5 years the real-estate funds provide higher mean returns. 
On the other hand, the equally weighted money/bond market portfolio (portfolio 2) ex-
hibits somewhat higher mean returns and volatilities than the real-estate funds. However the 
differences become smaller, the longer the investment horizon. Considering shortfall risk, 
portfolio 2 provides considerably lower shortfall probabilities and shortfall expectations for 
investment periods up to 15 years. Thereafter, the real-estate fund investment exhibits the 
lower shortfall probabilities and expectations, whereas they are, in any case, relatively low for -32- 
 
both investments. Furthermore, portfolio 2 provides significantly higher and continuously 
increasing MEL than the real-estate funds investment.  
Table 21: Ex Ante Risk and Return Profiles of Cumulative Real Returns (in %)  
for Different Holding Period Lengths (Target Return: 1.5% p.a.) 
Investment Horizon (years)  1  2  3  4  5  10  15  20 
                   
Mean  -1.48  1.92  5.33  8.73  12.13  29.14  46.15  63.16 
Std.Dev.  1.53  2.65  3.59  4.39  5.10  7.81  9.81  11.46 
SP  97.40  65.46  40.52  26.39  17.92  3.40  0.76  0.18 
SE  2.98  1.66  1.04  0.70  0.50  0.10  0.02  0.01 
Real-Estate Funds 
(5% Front end load) 
MEL  3.06  2.54  2.57  2.67  2.76  3.08  3.23  3.32 
                   
Mean  0.45  3.85  7.25  10.65  14.05  31.06  48.07  65.08 
Std.Dev.  1.53  2.65  3.59  4.39  5.10  7.81  9.81  11.46 
SP  75.27  37.11  21.88  14.25  9.76  1.91  0.43  0.10 
SE  1.27  0.68  0.45  0.32  0.23  0.05  0.01  0.00 
Real-Estate Funds 
(3% Front end load) 
MEL  1.68  1.83  2.05  2.25  2.40  2.85  3.06  3.18 
                   
Mean  2.17  5.09  8.01  10.92  13.84  28.43  43.02  57.61 
Std.Dev.  2.12  3.00  3.67  4.24  4.74  6.70  8.21  9.48 
SP  37.38  24.06  16.74  12.05  8.84  2.16  0.58  0.17 
SE  0.55  0.42  0.33  0.25  0.19  0.05  0.02  < 0.01 
Portfolio 1 
75% Cash / 25% 
Bonds 
MEL  1.47  1.77  1.95  2.09  2.19  2.48  2.63  2.72 
                   
Mean  1.93  5.36  8.78  12.20  15.62  32.73  49.84  66.96 
Std.Dev.  3.21  4.54  5.57  6.43  7.19  10.16  12.45  14.37 
SP  44.50  30.04  21.93  16.56  12.75  3.95  1.35  0.48 
SE  1.07  0.87  0.70  0.56  0.46  0.16  0.06  0.02 
Portfolio 2 
50% Cash / 50% 
Bonds 
MEL  2.41  2.89  3.19  3.41  3.58  4.09  4.36  4.53 
                   
Mean  1.64  5.50  9.37  13.23  17.10  36.42  55.74  75.06 
Std.Dev.  4.33  6.13  7.50  8.67  9.69  13.70  16.78  19.38 
SP  48.62  34.01  25.69  20.06  15.96  5.81  2.33  0.97 
SE  1.65  1.39  1.16  0.97  0.81  0.34  0.15  0.06 
Portfolio 3 
25% Cash / 75% 
Bonds 
MEL  3.40  4.08  4.52  4.84  5.10  5.87  6.28  6.55 
Notes: All numbers are in percent. Average cumulative real return (Mean), volatility (STD), and shortfall risk measures of the dif-
ferent investments are calculated, for holding periods between one and twenty years. SP is the shortfall probability, MEL is the mean excess 
loss, and SE is the shortfall expectation. Target return for the different shortfall risk measures is 1.5% p.a. Front-end loads: 3% for bonds, 
0% for money market, 5% for stocks, and 5% (3%) for real-estate funds. 
Finally the portfolio 3, which includes 75% bond market investments provides signifi-
cantly higher mean returns and volatilities for all holding periods compared to the real-estate 
funds investment. While the MEL of portfolio 3 is always higher than for the real-estate fund 
investment, the shortfall probability up to 4-year holding periods and the shortfall expectation 
up to 2-year investment horizons for portfolio 3 are lower, than for the real-estate fund in-
vestment. 
Especially for short-term investment horizons, the risk/return characteristics of the rep-
lication portfolios tend to be more favourable than the risk/return profile of the real-estate 
fund investment, even if they are not dominant. For longer-term investment horizons, the 
75%/25% portfolio (portfolio 1) best fits the real-estate fund investments risk/return profile. 
However, there are still significant differences remaining, suggesting that the risk/return pro-
file of real-estate funds cannot be easily replicated by simple cash/bond portfolio strategies. -33- 
 
5  Conclusion 
German real-estate mutual funds play a major role in the German market for securitised 
real-estate investments. However, not much literature concerning their short and long-term 
financial characteristics exists. The aim of this paper was to demonstrate the special financial 
characteristics of these funds and to compare them with other major asset classes, like money 
market instruments, bonds, and stocks. For this purpose, a capital-weighted real-estate fund 
index comprising all traded German real-estate funds over the time period of January 1975 to 
December 2002 was constructed. 
 In the context of a short-term returns analysis, monthly and yearly return time series of 
the various index portfolios, which represent the different asset classes, were scrutinised in 
univariate and multivariate settings. 
Univariate analyses showed that the German real-estate mutual funds clearly exhibit dif-
ferent risk/return-characteristics compared to stocks and bonds. In each case, their return vola-
tility was significantly lower than volatility of stocks and bonds, but at the expense of lower 
returns. Mean returns, as well as return volatilities of the real-estate funds, were found to be 
more stable over time than those of the other asset classes. Additionally, open-end real-estate 
funds exhibited significant serial correlation in their returns. Further analyses showed that this 
serial correlation is probably partially attributable to the influence of inflation rates on real-
estate funds returns. Like real-estate markets, a cyclical behaviour with cycle lengths of about 
11 to 13 years was observed for all real-estate funds. Worst-case analyses showed that real-
estate funds are as risk-free, in a worst-case framework, as cash; they even outperform cash 
with a high probability. 
Multivariate analyses showed that there are no significant correlations between real-
estate funds and the stock market. However, due to considerable liquidity holdings of open-
end real-estate funds, a significantly positive correlation to the bond and money markets could 
be detected. Correlations were also found to considerably fluctuate over different periods in 
time. 
Within the framework of an analysis of long-term returns, the study was extended to pe-
riod lengths of up to 20 years, and additionally, shortfall risk measures were employed. Due 
to the major impact of inflation in the long-term, the focus was on real returns. In contrast to 
the short-term analysis, purchasing transaction costs were accounted for in this section. B e-
sides ex post and ex ante risk/return comparisons between real-estate funds and the other asset 
classes, one aspect was the replication the of real-estate funds’ risk/return characteristics by 
using cash and bond investments. 
In the ex ante analysis stochastic processes were specified to simulate (future) asset per-
formance. With respect to the shortfall probability, the ex ante results equal the ex post re-
sults. The MEL, however, is not successively decreasing, but increasing from a 2-year to a 
20-year horizon. Here too, the long-term risk of real-estate is much lower than that of the 
other asset classes. 
When trying to replicate the risk/return profile of real-estate funds by simple portfolios 
of cash and bonds, these portfolios tend to show more favourable characteristics than the real-
estate funds in the short term. For longer time horizons, a portfolio of 75% cash and 25% 
bonds could somewhat approximate the risk/return profile of the real-estate funds, although 
clear differences remained. 
All in all, this study showed that in order to be profitable, investments in real-estate 
funds have to be long-term. In the short term, investments in other asset classes are more fa-
vourable and possibly dominant. Only with an investment horizon of five or more years can -34- 
 
the real-estate funds recover from the drawback of high front-end loads. Early disinvestments 
will likely result in capital losses. However, an investor holding real-estate fund units can, if 
he needs to quickly liquidate his assets, easily ask for redemption and, therefore, circumvent 
possible liquidity discounts. -35- 
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